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Rights-based institutions have been adopted for certain natural resources in order to more 
effectively mitigate the losses of the common pool. Past central government (command and 
control)  regulation has not proved satisfactory.  In deregulation, a  major issue has been  the 
assignment of those rights and controversy over  it has slowed the process.  In this paper, I 
examine three different allocation rules:  first-possession, lottery or uniform allocation, and 
auction and draw predictions as to when they might be adopted and why they are controversial. I 
analyze the assignment and nature of the rights granted  for  common-pool  resources where 
deregulation has occurred: oil and gas unit shares, emission permits, and selected fishery ITQ’s 
in six countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, New Zealand, and the U.S). I find that first-
possession rules dominate where there are incumbent users. Lotteries and auctions are rarely 
used. I discuss criticisms of first-possession rules and argue that first-possession is likely more 
efficient than previously recognized.  Accordingly, restrictions on  such allocations as part of 
deregulation (rights set-asides for particular groups and exchange limitations) may be costly in 







Command and control regulation typically has been the first formal government response 
to mitigate the losses of the common pool.
1 Dissatisfaction with the subsequent performance of 
regulation, however, has resulted in a search for alternative institutional responses, including 
deregulation and the corresponding assignment of property rights of some type as part of market-
based reforms.
2 For instance, Tietenberg (2003, 1) reported that tradable use permits were now 
used in 9 applications in air pollution control, 75 in fisheries, 3 in water, and 5 in land use control 
that previously had been regulated. Property rights approaches offer more flexibility, cost 
savings, information generation, migration to high-valued uses, and better alignment of 
incentives for conservation or investment in the resource. The more complete are property rights, 
                                                  
1 See Hannesson (2004 ) for example for discussion of the process of regulation and subsequent shift to privatization 
in some previously open access fisheries.  
2 See Stavins (2003, 1998b) for discussion of the movement toward market-based instruments.  This paper draws 
directly from discussion in Libecap (2007a, 2007b, 2007c).    2 
the more the private and social net benefits of resource use are meshed, eliminating externalities 
and the losses of the common pool.
3 By contrast, centralized regulation relies more upon uniform 
standards, arbitrary controls on access, constraints on timing of use, and/or limits on technology 
or production capital, and hence, suffers from high cost, inflexibility, ineffectiveness, and 
industry capture. Further, regulatory decisions take place in the absence of information about 
alternative uses that market trades generate. Finally, centralized state regulatory rules may or 
may not align with the incentives of actual users of the resource.  Generally, no party involved--
actual users, regulators, politicians—is a residual claimant to the social gains from investment or 
trade.
4  
Deregulation through the use of property rights, however, requires adoption of an 
allocation mechanism. Because of distributional implications, allocation can be very 
controversial and conflict over distribution limits the adoption of property rights and their 
effectiveness in mitigating the losses of the common pool. At least some constituencies, 
including regulators, who benefited from the previous regulatory arrangement, will be 
disadvantaged under a new rights system and have incentive to resist the new arrangement.  
Other parties that previously used the resource will be denied access. Production under a 
property rights regime has a different composition of inputs and timing than what occurs under 
open-access or regulation, with negative impacts on certain groups of labor, input sellers, service 
organizations, and processors. These production changes are inherent in the efficiency gains of 
privatization. Further, as the resource rebounds and becomes more valuable, new owners have 
wealth, status, and political influence not available to those without access privileges. These 
distributional factors, along with the costs of bounding, measurement, and enforcement constrain 
                                                  
3 Libecap (1989), Dahlman (1972). 
4 Johnson and Libecap (1994, 156-71)   3 
the extent and timing of the assignment of property rights to address the potential losses of the 
common pool as part of a process of deregulation.   
  
II. Open-Access, Regulation, and the Allocation of Property Rights.  
  The Losses of the Commons  
The losses of the commons are well known. Garrett Hardin’s, “The Tragedy of the 
Commons” (Science, 1968) made clear in the popular scientific press what resource users had 
always understood, that open-access can result in important economic and social costs.5 Hardin 
was not the first to call attention to the tragedy of the commons, however.  More than a decade 
before his article, H. Scott Gordon (1954) clearly outlined similar logic in another classic: "The 
Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery. Gordon=s analysis was 
extended by Scott (1955), Cheung (1970), among others.  
Central State (Command and Control) Regulation 
The first formal response to the commons generally has been central, command and 
control regulation of entry and production to include: a). restrictions on access or time of use, 
such as limits placed on non-citizens or non-residents in fisheries;  b). equipment controls, such 
as on vessel size or technology used in fisheries and uniform requirements for scrubbers on 
power plants; and c). extraction regulations, such as prorationing in oil production and air 
pollution emission controls.  The aim of these regulations is to constrain output to more optimal 
levels and thereby avoid some rent dissipation.   
State regulation is the initial resort for a number of reasons. One is that it avoids the 
complex, costly, and controversial allocation of more definite property rights, which could 
directly address the problem of externalities. Second, state regulation may involve lower costs of 
                                                  
5 Discussion drawn from Libecap (1998).   4 
measurement, bounding, and enforcement, and if the resource is of relatively low value, more 
definite property rights may be too costly to be an option.
6 Another reason is that state regulation 
is consistent with the notion that many natural resources are rightly “public” with ownership 
reserved in the state rather than in private parties. Similarly, if there are important public goods 
associated with the resource, then state ownership and regulation of access may be optimal. 
Finally, state regulation can advantage certain influential political constituencies who mold 
regulatory policy in their behalf.  While market processes are relatively transparent, political and 
bureaucratic processes are less so, facilitating preferential treatment to certain parties.7  
Allocation of Property Rights    
Often, state regulation involves high cost and inflexibility and is ineffective in stemming 
open-access losses. If the resource is of high enough value to warrant adoption of more definite 
property rights and resort to more flexible market processes, then deregulation can occur. But 
property rights arrangements are costly and how they are implemented affects their timing and 
efficacy in addressing the losses of the commons.  There are several allocation mechanisms: 
First-Possession Rules. 
As we will see, first-possession is the dominant method of establishing property rights.
8 It 
assigns ownership on a first-come, first-served basis or first-in-time, first-in-right. First-
possession rules are attractive because they recognize incumbent parties, who have experience in 
exploiting the resource and hence, may be the low-cost, high-valued users. Incumbents also have 
a direct stake in access to the resource and will be important constituents in any property rights 
distribution. They are concerned about past investment in specific assets, which otherwise would 
                                                  
6 See Alston, Libecap and Schneider (1996) for discussion of the emergence of property rights as resource values 
change. 
7 For discussion of the problem of oversight when information is limited, see Johnson and Libecap (2001).  
8 See discussion of first possession in Epstein (1979), Rose (1985), and Lueck (1995, 1998).   5 
not be deployable to other uses. Since first-possession rules recognize these investments, this 
security should encourage future outlays. Allocations that do not consider the position of 
incumbents will face opposition, raising the costs of rights assignment and enforcement.
9  
First-possession rules also recognize valuable risk taking by innovators and 
entrepreneurs, who first experiment with and use a resource. Further, under first-possession the 
market determines optimal claim size, whereas under other allocation arrangements bureaucratic 
or political objectives define the assignments. If these are not consistent with optimal production 
size then further trade is required. Hence, first-possession can economize on transaction costs.10 
Examples of first-possession rules include allocating property rights based on historical catch in 
fisheries, on past fuel use in emission permits, prior appropriation in water rights, and on novelty 
in patent and copyright assignment.  
A criticism of first-possession is that it can encourage competing parties to race for 
ownership and to dissipate rents. If the parties are homogeneous, then full dissipation is possible.  
If, on the other hand, the parties are heterogeneous and the property rights are long-term and 
secure, then allocation losses will be more limited.11 There are costs with any rights allocation 
rule, and the “winners” of such a race may be the most efficient producers. Accordingly, first-
possession may not be more costly than other assignments. Generally, if the transaction costs of 
subsequent exchange are high, then it makes sense to assign rights to low-cost users with 
histories of past involvement in the resource. 
Despite their ubiquity, first-possession rules can conflict with fairness considerations, and 
this situation raises political opposition to them in the assignment of property rights. First-
                                                  
9 See also, Tietenberg (2003, 10). 
10 See Epstein (1979). 
11 Johnson and Libecap (1982) show that heterogeneity among fishers limits rent dissipation even under open-access 
and the rule of capture.   6 
possession discriminates against new entrants. If first-possession ownership is viewed as 
rewarding those who by luck and connections were allocated the right, then they may be opposed 
or their returns taxed.
12  
Uniform Allocation Rules.   
Equal sharing rules avoid the distributional concerns associated with first-possession and 
better reflect egalitarian goals. If there are no restrictions on subsequent exchange of property 
rights and transaction costs are low, there are few efficiency implications. The resource still 
migrates to high-valued users. Uniform allocations also avoid the measurement costs of verifying 
claims of past production or use or of documenting precedence claims that are part of first-
possession assignments. They can also avoid the costly pursuit of property rights when first-
possession is known to be the allocation rule. Lotteries are examples of uniform allocations 
because each claimant is given an equal, random draw in the assignment of rights to the resource.  
Uniform allocations are most effective when applied to new resources where there no incumbent 
claims and all parties are relatively homogeneous.  
Auction Allocation. 
A third allocation mechanism is auction. It can directly place asset into the hands of those 
who have the highest value for the asset. It thereby avoids the transaction costs of re-allocation. 
Auctions also generate resources for the state and avoid the windfalls that might be considered 
unearned and divisive. Auction returns can be used to cover the costs of defining and enforcing 
property rights and other costs of resource management. As with lotteries, auctions work best for 
new, unallocated resources where there are no incumbent claimants and where resource values 
are very high. By granting more of the rents to the state, auctions reduce the distributional 
implications of first-possession or uniform-allocation. As with other allocation arrangements, 
                                                  
12 Alesina and Angeletos  (2005, 960-80).      7 
there are costs to auctions. The state must be able to measure and enforce resource boundaries 
and individual allocations secured by auction. The terms of the auction may also be influenced 
by competing claimants who lobby for rules that provide them with specific advantages. Because 
of their design costs and opposition by incumbent users, auctions are not used as often as 
economists have predicted.
13 With these concepts in mind, we now turn to environmental and 
natural resources where rights institutions have been adopted to augment or replace central 
regulation:  oil and natural gas, air pollution emission permits, and fisheries.  
 
III. Allocation of Rights to Subsurface Oil and Gas Reservoirs in North America.   
  In the United States and Canada rights to access oil, natural gas, and other minerals 
generally are assigned to surface land owners. Actual ownership of subterranean oil and natural 
gas comes through the common law rule of capture, which creates conditions for competitive 
open-access extraction if there are multiple surface owners above the deposit. The first response 
to open-access was state regulation of production, with most regulations adopted in the U.S. 
between the early 1930s and 1960. Libecap and Smith (2002) describe the pattern of state 
regulation of oil and gas production. Overall production “allowables” were determined each year 
in each state based on geologic conditions and more importantly, on estimated oil demand and 
supply. These allowables were then prorated among the regulated firms as annual production 
quotas.  Quotas were based on past production and investment, such as the number and depth of 
existing wells on a lease. The latter variables encouraged denser drilling of deep, costly wells in 
order to increase quota size, and thereby shifted regulated production from low to high-cost 
producers. Further to gain their political support for regulation, the owners of numerous small, 
                                                  
13 Tietenberg (2003, 10) notes that auctions were used extensively in just one ITQ in Chile.  Historical catch was the 
dominant allocation mechanism. Lueck (1998, 136), McMillan (1994) points to the costs of auctions.   8 
high-cost firms in Texas were able to obtain exemption from prorationing rules for their so-
called “stripper” wells (very high-cost, low-production wells). These and other preferences to 
high-cost small firms reduced the overall benefits of regulation by over $2 billion annually by 
the early 1960s. As a result, state regulation (prorationing) was criticized as being very costly.
14 
There were calls for less reliance upon regulation and more on private production controls 
through unitization through deregulation.  
Under unitization, production is delegated through negotiation to a single firm, the unit 
operator, with net revenues apportioned among all parties on the field (including those that 
would otherwise be producing).  As the only producer on the field and a residual profit claimant, 
the unit operator has incentive to maximize field rents.  Accordingly, unitization results in 
important economic gains: a time stream of output that more closely approximates the rent-
maximizing pattern, increased oil recovery, and reduced wells and other capital costs.  
Despite these attractions and advantages over central state regulation, conflicts over the 
allocation of unit shares or property rights have slowed unitization.15 Wiggins and Libecap 
(1985) examine the bargaining problem underlying unit formation and Libecap and Smith (1999) 
describe the nature of a complete unit contract. As a result of conflicts over allocation, unit 
agreements can take a very long time to negotiate or breakdown and result in incomplete units 
that cover only part of a field. In their detailed analysis of 7 units in Texas and New Mexico, 
Wiggins and Libecap found that they required from 4 to 9 years from the time negotiations began 
until agreements could be reached.  Moreover, in 5 of the 7 cases the acreage in the final unit 
was less than that involved in the early negotiations.  With incomplete units, part of the reservoir 
remains open-access or is organized into competitive subunits with significant losses.  In the case 
                                                  
14 Libecap and Smith (2002, S595). 
15 Libecap (1989, 93-114).   9 
of Prudhoe Bay, North America’s largest producing field, Libecap and Smith describe a lengthy 
and contentious bargaining process. The field was discovered in 1968 and unit negotiations 
began in 1969. The first unit agreement was not reached until 1977 and was revised at least 
seven times due to disputes among the key producers over natural gas and oil valuation, 
investment, and production.  In 1999 British Petroleum, one of the largest producers on the field, 
purchased ARCO, the other major operator, to effectively complete unitization of the field.   
To speed the process of unitization and deregulation, states have intervened with so-
called compulsory or forced unitization statutes as the costs of reliance solely on prorationing 
became apparent. These statutes relaxed unanimity voting requirements for share allocations. 
Between the late 1940s and the 1960s, all oil-producing states, except Texas adopted some form 
of forced unitization law to facilitate unit formation. Only in Texas was the power of small firms 
sufficiently great to block the legislation. Not surprisingly, Texas has a lower share of production 
from fully-unitized fields than does other states.  It also has had more high-cost producers than 
other states. 
 
IV. Allocation of Air Pollution Emission Permits.  
  Early regulatory efforts to reduce air pollution in the U.S. generally were costly and not 
effective.  They relied on relatively inflexible, uniform air quality standards and required that 
polluting firms meet them. Regulation included rules on emissions, equipment to be used, such 
as types of scrubbers and performance standards. The uniform rules did not recognize that the 
costs of controlling emissions varied across and within firms. Traditional regulation gave 
advantages to old plants and technology. There were few incentives to develop new 
technologies, and central regulation was often used politically to disadvantage certain firms and   10 
regions at the behest of entrenched interests with little environmental benefit.16 Beginning in the 
mid 1970s dissatisfaction with the costs and performance of centralized air pollution regulation 
led to deregulation and adoption of emission trading programs, despite some resistance from 
regulatory agencies.
17 . 
  Under deregulation, an annual targeted level of emissions is set and then prorated across 
permit holders, who are allowed to discharge a specified amount of pollution. The permits have 
been allocated through first-possession, based on past electricity production, heat generation, fuel 
use or emissions, free of charge. In some cases, a small portion, about 2 percent, have been 
auctioned to provide flexibility and to allow new entry by firms that did not have production 
histories.  These emission permits are a right to use the air to discharge waste products in 
production. They can be traded and an active market has developed in most emission systems 
where tradable permits have been used.
18 Rather than equating pollution levels across firms, 
these instruments equalize incremental abatement costs. Those firms with pollution below their 
allowable allotments can sell the residual emission rights, apply them to offset excess emissions 
in other parts of their operations, or bank them. As an example, consider SO2 deregulation and 
trading under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. There are various estimates of the cost 
savings of the program, but they range from $5 to $12 billion over the command and control 
regulation alternative.   
  The objective was to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions by 10 million and 2 million tons 
respectively from their 1980 levels. These are the principle gases associated with acid rain and 
they largely were emitted by electrical utilities.  Two phases were used. Phase I, which ran 
through 1995, assigned emission permits to over 400 electrical generating plants and Phase II, 
                                                  
16 Pashigian (1985). 
17 Dewees (1998).  
18 Tietenberg (2003, 12), Stavins (2003, 4).    11 
which extended regulation to almost all generating units.19 Total emissions were gradually 
reduced each year to achieve the targeted level.  
Emission permits were granted on first-possession so that existing polluters were 
grandfathered and newer units were disadvantaged. There is no available information on how 
negotiations over pollution rights may have slowed the process of deregulation. Nevertheless, 
politics clearly played a role. Utilities that began operating in 1996 and thereafter had to 
purchase their allowances on the open market. Phase I allowances were allocated free of charge 
based on past power generation as indicated by heat input. The allocation formula granted 
emission rates of 2.5 pounds of SO2/mmBtu (million British thermal units) of heat input, 
multiplied by the unit's baseline, mm Btu (the average fossil fuel consumed from 1985 through 
1987).  Utilities in key states such as Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio were allocated an additional 
200,000 allowances annually during Phase I.  In these states there were important coal interests 
and all had ranking members or chairs of key Congressional subcommittees.
20 Additional 
allowances were granted to plants where scrubbers had been installed that reduced SO2 
emissions by 90 percent and to plants where emissions were reduced through use of renewable 
energy.  A small portion of the allowances, 2.8% of the total allowances for a year, were 
auctioned by the EPA.
21   
Phase II allowances are part of a tighter overall annual emissions cap. The formula used 
in determining the initial allocation took an emission rate of 1.2 lbs of SO2/mmBtu of heat input, 
times the unit’s baseline. As with phase I, exceptions and additional allowances were made for 
political and technical reasons.  Additional allowances were allocated to units that did not 
perform at their capacity during the base year due to equipment malfunctions. Greater allowance 
                                                  
19 Stavins (1998b, 6-13). 
20 Ellerman (2000, 40-43). 
21Ellerman (2000, 8-9)    12 
allocations were granted to smaller units.22 An opt-in program also was used to encourage very 
low-polluting utilities to enter by granting them allowances which could be traded to others.  
  
V. Allocation of ITQ’s in Fisheries.  
  Wild ocean fisheries are classic open-access resources.
 Over entry, over fishing, over 
capitalization, falling catch per unit of effort, and depleted stocks follow from the fugitive nature 
of most species, distances involved, overlapping political jurisdictions, and large numbers of 
heterogeneous, competing fishers.23 The implications of open access have been understood for a 
very long time (Gordon, 1954), yet Grafton, Squires, and Fox (2000) described the dramatic 
wastes of over fishing and regulation in the Pacific Northwest halibut fishery, and a 2003 Nature 
article by Myers and Worm (2003) reported that the world’s major predatory fish populations 
were in a state of serious depletion.
24  
  Historically, the initial response has been command and control regulation with denial of 
access to certain groups—non-citizens with expansion of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), 
sports versus commercial fishers, inshore versus offshore fishers, large-vessel versus small-
vessel fishers, or vise-versa, and so on. This action temporarily reduced fishing pressure, but it 
did not solve the fundamental problem which is that rents exist for those who can find ways 
around the regulations.  
  As these failed, new command and control regulations such as fixed seasons, area 
closures, and gear restrictions were put into place. These arrangements are politically attractive 
to regulators because they do not upset status quo rankings, minimize existing transaction costs, 
                                                  
22 Ellerman (2000, 43-48). 
23 Libecap and Johnson (1982), Leal, (2005), Tietenberg (2003, 5-12), and Hannesson (2004) for discussion of the 
emergence of various regulatory/property regimes.  
24 A similar conclusion for deep-sea fisheries was reported by Devine, Baker and Haedrich (2006), also in Nature.   13 
and call for major regulatory mandates, which are attractive to regulators and politicians. But 
they have not been successful. They do not align the incentives of fishers with protection of the 
stock. Further, given heterogeneous fishers and limited and asymmetric information about the 
stock and the contribution of fishing relative to natural factors, there are disputes about the 
design and efficacy of these regulations. Finally, there is no basis for fishers to contract among 
themselves to reduce fishing pressure and thereby to capture the returns from an improved stock. 
There are no property rights to exchange.  
  With deregulation, there has been a turn to individual transferable quotas (ITQ’s) in some 
fisheries, after continued declines in the stock under centralized regulation. ITQ’s require 
restrictions on entry, the setting of an annual total allowable catch, TAC, the allocation of rights 
or quotas to a share of the TAC, and enforcement.  
The more secure, definite, durable, divisible, and permanent the ITQ, the stronger is the 
property right. And stronger property rights better link the incentives of fishers with the goal of 
maximizing the economic value of the fishery. The value of each quota as a share of the TAC 
depends on the state of fish stocks and the sustainability of the fishery.25 Enforcement costs may 
decline relative to those under other forms of regulation because fishers have a stake in the 
preservation of the stock as shareholders in the right to fish and self-monitor. 
There are efficiency advantages to first possession. Assigning quotas to those with 
knowledge and past experience in the fishery is consistent with granting rights to the low-cost 
users.  This practice reduces the need for subsequent re-allocation and therefore, economizes on 
transaction costs. Reserving the fishery rents to fishers, rather than granting them to the state via 
auctions, also, enhances long-term incentives of fishers for protection of the stock and provides 
incentives for investment. Collaboration between fishers and regulators in setting the TAC not 
                                                  
25 Arnason (2002, 1).   14 
only reduces resistance to the catch limit, but incorporates stock and habitat information 
collected by the industry.
26    
Other parties, such as processors and other input suppliers (crews, dock owners, boat and 
equipment sellers and support providers) and their communities, however, may be adversely 
affected by changes in harvest patterns made possible by ITQ regimes. There are additional 
concerns that transferability of quotas and associated consolidation of the industry, which also 
bring efficiency gains, will gradually squeeze out small vessel owners. Regulators also may 
resist ITQ’s because of a potentially reduced regulatory mandate or diminished ties to specific 
constituents that become less active in the fishery under the ITQ. The following summarizes 
selected ITQ allocation issues in fisheries in five countries, Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland, 
New Zealand, and the United States.  
Australia 
There are at least 20 ITQ-managed fisheries in Australia, covering about 34 percent of 
the volume and 22 percent of the value of the country’s fisheries.27 The dominant allocation 
method is first-possession based on historical catch. Prior investment plays a smaller role. There 
are equity considerations in certain fisheries leading to equal or uniform quota distributions 
and/or restrictions on the maximum and minimum amounts of quotas that can be held as well as 
requirements that quotas be exchanged only among license holders.  ITQ’s in Australia are 
comparatively strong property rights, being permanent, divisible, and transferable, and 
apparently can serve as collateral for long-term loans. 
  Canada 
                                                  
26 See criticism of grandfathering in Fullerton and Metcalf (2001).  
27 Arnason (2002, 3-11).   15 
  There are ITQ’s in about 40 fisheries in Canada, accounting for over 50 percent of the 
value and volume of landings.
28 In established fisheries, allocations are based on historical catch, 
modified by vessel size, capacity, and recent investment. The quotas are granted without charge. 
Most quotas, such as those for Pacific halibut (1991) and sablefish (1990), were adopted between 
1982 and 1998. In one newer fishery, the North Atlantic shrimp fishery, a uniform quota 
allocation of the TAC was used. In that fishery there were only a small number of licenses and 
limited historical catch records. In Canada, ITQ’s as property are weaker than in Australia. They 
do not have the legal status of property, but rather held as a use privilege, subject to renewal and 
regulation. In most fisheries there are no limits on number of quotas that can be held, but there 
are no guarantees of permanence. Their term is the same as the fishing license, which generally 
is more or less automatically renewed. 
  Chile 
In 2002, there were four ITQ fisheries in Chile, the squat lobster, yellow prawn, black 
hack, and orange roughy.29 Unlike the Australian and Canadian systems, initial allocation was by 
auction, followed by annual auctions of 10 percent of the outstanding quota shares. There are 
few participants (less than 10) in each of these fisheries so that allocation issues may have been 
less contentious. The ITQ’s are transferable, divisible, and are not linked to a vessel. There are 
no maximum limits on the number of quotas that can be held by a firm, but during the annual 
auctions no firm can bid for more than 50 percent of the TAC. Based on the success of these 
ITQ’s, they are being extended to other established fisheries, and are to be allocated through 
first-possession, based roughly on 50 percent weight on historical catch for the past four years 
                                                  
28 Arnason (2002, 12-17). 
29 Arnason (2002, 18-23).   16 
for purse seiners and past two years for trawlers, and 50 percent vessel hold capacity. There are 
restrictions on transferability to existing fishers.  
Iceland 
Iceland is one of the first countries to adopt ITQ’s.
30 Herring quotas were implemented in 
1975 and 1979; quotas in the capelin fishery in 1980 and 1986; quotas in the demersal fisheries 
in 1984; and ITQ’s to all fisheries in 1991. 16 species are covered for 95 percent of the volume 
of the total catch. The quotas were granted without charge and include a right to catch a given 
proportion of the TAC every year. TAC shares are divisible and transferable.  In the demersal, 
lobster, scallop, and deep-sea shrimp fisheries, ITQ’s were allocated on the basis of vessel 
historical catch, 3 years prior to quota system adoption. In the herring and inshore shrimp 
fisheries, where smaller vessels may have predominated, there were initially equal shares for 
eligible vessels. There have been some restrictions on the transfer of annual quotas between 
geographical regions to protect local employment, and recent requirements that vessels holding 
quotas must be involved in harvest.  
  New Zealand 
New Zealand is also one of the first countries to adopt ITQ systems.
31 After declines in 
deep water stocks within the 200-mile EEZ, New Zealand adopted ITQ’s in 1983 based on 1982 
catch volume and vessel capacity.  In 1986 an inshore ITQ system was adopted for vessels active 
in 1985 based on 1982-4 catch histories.  In both the offshore and inshore fisheries ITQ’s 
initially were fixed quantities, but these were changed to shares in 1990. Equity concerns led to 
assignment of 40 percent of the quota to the Maori. The ITQ’s are permanent, divisible, and 
                                                  
30 Arnason (2002, 24-33). 
31 Arnason (2002, 45-51).   17 
transferable, with no restrictions on trade among participants. The rights apparently are as secure 
as those that exist for land. The rights security is similar to that found in Australia.  
  United States 
  ITQ’s are more limited and are a weaker property right in the U.S. than in many other 
major fishing countries.
32 Only four U.S. marine fisheries operate under such regimes: the Mid-
Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, the Alaskan halibut and sablefish fishery, and the 
South Atlantic wreckfish fishery, all adopted in the early 1900s. Two extensions were under 
consideration in 1995 for the Gulf of Mexico red snapper and Pacific sablefish fisheries, but 
tabled with the 1996 Congressional 4-year moratorium on further ITQ’s.
33 The ITQ’s are a 
permanent share of the TAC, divisible and tradable. They are allocated on the basis of historical 
catch at no charge.  
In the Alaska halibut and sable fish fisheries, allocations went only to vessel owners who 
had landings during 1988-90 (historical catch) and were based on the best five of seven harvest 
years between 1984 and 1990 for halibut and best five of six harvest years between 1985 and 
1990. Quotas go the vessels and owners must be on the vessels (a type of beneficial use 
requirement). Part of the halibut TAC is reserved for community development quotas. ITQ’s in 
these two fisheries are weaker than in the others. There are restrictions of transferability to those 
in same management area and vessel class involving fishers with 150 days commercial fishing 
and there are minimum and maximum quota limits. Moreover, only transfers from larger to 
smaller vessel classes are permitted, and no individual is allowed to own more than 0.5 percent 
                                                  
32 Arnason (2002, 52-7). 
33 The Sustainable Fisheries Act (PL 104-297). 
   18 
of the total quota. There are other controls on share consolidation to limit holdings and to 
maintain a targeted number of vessels in the halibut fleet.
34  
   
VI. Concluding Remarks. 
  Deregulation of many common pool resources has taken place through the adoption of 
property rights arrangements of some type. This institutional change has occurred as central 
regulation has failed to stem the losses of the commons. Allocation of property rights, however, 
has been a major issue in determining the timing and extent of deregulation.  Table 1 summarizes 
the distribution of property rights for oil and gas unit shares, air pollution emission permits, and 
individual transferable fishing quotas in six countries.  As shown, first-possession allocation 
rules dominate where incumbent users existed at the time of establishing the rights regime under 
deregulation. Auctions are adopted very infrequently. Although first-possession is criticized by 
many economists as being inefficient, its empirical regularity suggests that there are efficiency 
advantages beyond political expediency.  Equity issues, however, often have constrained the type 
of property right assigned. The more limited the property right, the less effective it will be in 
addressing the losses of the commons.  
There is the potential for waste due to a race to establish credentials for the subsequent 
assignment of use rights if first-possession is known to be the allocation rule and the parties are 
homogeneous. Just how important this problem is depends on the empirical case at hand. In 
general, for most of the resources examined here, there was a long history of prior use before the 
introduction of rights-based institutions and the claimants were heterogeneous. Hence, the real 
costs of race may have been comparatively low.  
                                                  
34 Doyle, Singh, and Weninger (2005). 
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In every case except for oil and gas unit shares, the rights granted are use rights only. 
They are not a right to the resource itself. In general, ownership of the stock is much more 
difficult to define and enforce than to the flow of use. Political factors also have influenced the 
nature of the rights system.  In fisheries, for example, preferential assignments to certain groups 
of fishers (small, community) and accompanying restrictions on exchange lower the value of the 
rights and the value of the fishery.  
 
Table I 
Summary of Allocation Mechanisms in Deregulation of Natural Resources  
Resource  Nature of the 
Property Right 
Allocation  Allocation Constraints 
Oil and Gas 
Unit Shares. 
Full, legal property 
right. 
First Possession (Rule of 
Capture). 
No restrictions on trade.  
Small producers granted preferences 
in regulation and restrictions on 




Explicitly, not a 
property right.  
First Possession 
Limited (2.8%) Auction in 
Phase I. 
Some preferences to coal using states 
in SO2 permits. More restrictions on 
banking in RECLAIM. 
Certain Fishery 
ITQs 
     
Australia.  Use rights. 
Legal property 
right. 
First Possession (historical 
catch, some past investment). 
Some quota trade restrictions. 
Canada.  Use rights. 
Not property. 
First Possession (historical 




Some quota trade restrictions. 
Chile.  Use rights.  Auction. 
First Possession (historical 
catch and vessel size) 
Some quota trade restrictions. 
Iceland.  Use rights. Fairly 
strong property 
right 
First possession (historical 
catch, vessel size). 
Some quota trade restrictions. 
New Zealand.  Use rights. 
Legal property 
right. 
First Possession (historical 
catch and past investment). 
Some quota trade restrictions. 
Reservation of quota share for Maori. 
U.S.  Use rights. 
Uncertain.  
First Possession (historical 
catch). 
Some quota trade restrictions. 
Community quota reservations. 
Actual fishers. 
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